Abstract. Modeling the fulfillment of global properties like survivability is a challenging problem in unbounded systems such as Grids, peer-to-peer systems, or swarms. This paper proposes Folded Interaction Systems (F IS) , an extension of the classic I-Systems frame work, to overcome the modeling issues. FIS is applied to a case of survivability assessment in Grids and demonstrates the identification of essential capabilities, the modeling of harmful incidents, and the derivation of standard strategies to sustain the survival of a system's mission. FIS is not restricted to survivability, it can be used for investi gating the preservation of any global property.
Introduction
The Internet, Grids, peer-to-peer systems, and swarms over dynamic ad hoc networks are all examples of unbounded systems. They differ significantly from bounded systems as they neither exhibit a common administra tive control, nor does any of their components have a complete view of the (dynamically changing) system as a whole, nor may any of its components exercise control in other system parts [1] . (We use the term "system" here in its broadest sense which not only cov ers hardware and software but also human re sources. Examples of "components" are thus logical entities, human beings, network nodes, or complete Grid sites.)
A serious problem arises when combining 
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systems comprising relatively isolated, small scale elements into an unbounded conglom erate. As can be observed in Grids [2] , the primary challenge is not the coordination of the components for joined problem solving (although difficult enough). Rather, it is the fundamental requirement to preserve the "local" system properties (e.g., security, ro bustness, availability) in-the-large, while at the same time to fulfill the "mission" of the system-as-a-whole defined by a set of global properties to achieve. For example, keeping an essential set of Grid services reliable does not only depend on the reliability of the un derlying Grid resources but also on the re lationships between them [3] . Ensuring that systems survive their mission -despite the presence of intrusions or disasters -is the pri mary objective of the discipline of survivabil ity [4] . We will discuss this in more detail in section 2. Reasoning about survivability is not pos sible without a formal system model that is able to express global properties, their de pendencies on local interactions, the propa gation of such interactions, and the transfor mation from non-safeness to again-safeness. Such a framework is not available today. In this paper we propose supplementing Interac tion Systems (IS) [5] with foldings for closing this gap. The basic idea is to use IS for mod eling systems and foldings for model transfor mations. Folded Interaction Systems will be introduced in section 3.
The suitability of the FIS modeling ap proach will be demonstrated in section 4 by exemplarily assessing the survivability of (an excerpt from) a production Grid authoriza tion framework.
In section 5 we briefly compare FIS with related work before concluding the paper.
The Problem of Modeling Sur vivable Unbounded Systems
The primary objective of survivability is the system's mission to survive instead of sin gle components. There are several challenges related to this (cf. [6] ):
1. What is the system's mission? 2. Which essential capabilities need to sur vive? 3. What do they have to survive? 4. How can systems be designed with sur vivability already "built-in"? 5. How can system components (especially legacy components) be instrumented a posteriori to achieve survivability? 6. How can survivability be assessed in a methodologically sound manner at de sign time? 7. How can "survivability performance" be monitored and audited at run time?
While these challenges relate to the surviv ability of any system, unbounded systems ex hibit specific constraints due to their (partial) autonomy. In unbounded systems the sys tem components belong to different admin istrative domains. Typically, they are man aged by component managers. These man agers communicate with each other for coor dinating cooperative tasks or for sharing re sources, but they are independent otherwise [2] . Within their own component, however, they completely exercise control over the lo cal processes by enabling or disabling local state transitions. The focus is hence on "dis tributed control" as opposed to specific func tionality. The constraints summarize to: Related to survivability these constraints translate to questions like: Can components interact in an unintended manner? Are there unreachable global states which would par tition the whole system? Is an unintended "coalition" between system components pos sible (which may lead to deadlocks or live locks)? How can a system be migrated from a non-safe situation into an again-safe one?
Discussing such issues in the same model ing framework is not possible today as there is no such framework available. We propose Folded Interaction Systems (FIS), a combina tion of Interaction System (IS) [5] and struc ture preserving foldings to close this gap. In the next section we briefly describe IS before introducing foldings between IS-models.
Folded Interaction Systems (FIS)
Interaction Systems (IS) are based on the single assumption that every system com ponent (called part) is in exactly one state (called phase) at any time. Other than re lated formal approaches (e.g. , Petri Nets, communicating Finite State Machines, 7r calculus), IS do not specify the allowed inter actions (these would be intractable in large scale systems). Rather, the idea is to al low everything and specify only the restric tions to obey. There are exactly two types of restrictions: the mutual exclusion of phases (called coupling), and the uni-directional en forcement of phases.
IS are graphically represented as depicted in Figure 1 where phases are represented by small circles and parts by rounded rectangles.
The phase a part is currently in is in dicated by a filled circle (the phase token). The set of phases currently holding phase to kens is called a case. Directed edges between phases denote enforcements while undirected ones represent mutual phase exclusions. In ert parts have a gray background and they are labeled using square brackets. In Figure [b] will then leave 4 unless prevented by other exter nal influences. As long as 4 has not been left, however, part a is supposed to stay in 1. No tice that phases of the same part are mutually exclusive by definition. More formally Definition 1 (IS). An IS is a structure 18 = (P,B,I,K,E) with 1. P is a finite set of phases 2. B is a partition of P 3. I is a set of inert parts (I � B) 4. K � P x P is a symmetric coupling re lation for expressing mutual exclusion 5. E � P x P is an enforcement relation for expressing enforcements between phases
The dynamics of an IS is described by the "firing rule" in Algorithm 1, an axiomatic foundation of which can be found in [5] .
The rule is based on a neighborhood con cept. A neighbor of a phase p E b is any phase q in a part b' i-b which is related to p by ei ther mutual exclusion (the coupling relation K) or by the enforcements of E and E-1 . A neighbor is occupied if it holds a phase token. For example, the phase set {1,5} in Figure  1 defines the neighborhood of phase 4 E [b] and the occupied neighbors is empty under the given phase token distribution.
From the behavior graph in Figure 2 we derive the impossibility of a phase transition 1 --+ 2 in case {I, 3, 7}, whereas the transi tion 5 --+ 7 is possible. As an example of a multistage influence propagation consider a 133 phase transition in part c from 7 to 5 in case {I, 4, 7}. The transition would induce part [b] to leave phase 4 to phase 3. Please notice that part a is now unable to leave phase 1 because of the coupling between phases 2 and 3. After this preparation we can now define IS-foldings as structure preserving mappings: An example of an iterated application of IS-foldings will be given in the next section when applying FIS to the survivability ana lysis of a Grid authorization framework.
Algorithm 1 Local Transition Rule
Require: p E b holds current phase token Require: p ' is a potential successor 1: if neither p nor p ' E b have an occupied neighbor then b may decide to pass the phase token on to p ' , provided b is au tonomous (and not inert) 2: if p is enforced by an occupied neighbor phase q then b has to leave p 3: if p ' E b enforces an occupied neighbor phase then b may decide to pass the phase token on to p ' , provided b is autonomous (and not inert)
Applying FIS to Analyze the Sur vivability of a Grid Authorization Framework
Loosely, Grid authorization is the act of providing and checking the authority of a user or a Grid job on a specific set of Grid re
sources. An IS model (DGAFo) of (an ex cerpt from) the D-Grid authorization frame work (DGAF) [7] is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 : Excerpt from the D-Grid authorization framework [7] (Model DGAFo)
Resources (the inert part
(based on a valid EEC) and the corre sponding EEC owner has to be registered in VOMS as a VO member (an "appli cant" status is not enough). 2. Resource access may nonetheless be de nied even for a valid Grid job. A typical scenario would be the unavailability of a required resource. 3. VO applicants will get member status once they are registered in the VOMS system. 4. VO memberships need to be deleted from the VOMS system upon mem bership termination (enforcement (member, registered)). 5. Any invalidation of an EEC requires the immediate co-invalidation of all derived proxy certificates.
From the discussion before it should be ob vious that further restrictions (e.g., certificate revocation lists, credential repositories) can be added incrementally.
Survivability assessment generally follows a multistage process [6] consisting of an es sential property assessment, an incident as sessment, and a strategy definition to sustain survivability. In the following we will briefly demonstrate how FIS can be applied to sup port these stages.
Essential Property Assessment
One (there may be many) DGAF mission statement is "to avoid resource access grants without a valid certificate". This mISSIOn neither requires VOMS to execute nor a VO to operate. It only re quires the mutual exclusion of the phases not valid E [EEC] and access E [Resource]. In FIS terms this translates into the specifi cation of a strong IS-folding the target IS of which (DGAFd is given in Figure 4 . 
Incident Assessment
In FIS we are able to express incidents as deviations from the nominal model defined at design time to specify the "correct service" [4] . Deviations either occur as illegal restrictions or as invalid extensions.
For example, an unintended permanent resource access can be forced -provided this was granted before once -by adding a part construct like the one in Figure 5 (part "Disaster") . In a similar way, access ing a Grid resource despite an invalid EEC can be achieved by adding one or more un coupled phases to part Job M gr allowing for unintended transitions. Generally, inci dents are (in FIS terms) "combinations " of IS (the nominal one and models describing intrusions) integrated by IS-foldings.
It should be noticed that the detection of incidents requires suitable mechanisms to dis tinguish "invalid" behavior from intended be- havior (self/non-self tolerance). This topic will be addressed in more detail in a follow up paper.
Strategies for Sustaining Survivability
Formally speaking, mission fulfillment means transforming the system from a non safe global state into an again-safe global state with at least all essential properties pre served. There are several strategies to achieve this transformation. They can be derived di rectly from the model. We briefly mention just three.
1. The cut-off strategy aims at achieving mission survivability by cutting off sys tem parts. It assumes undamaged essen tial properties .
2. The peripheral tolerance strategy aims at extending the system in such a way that the damaging parts (the periphery) are tolerated.
3. The degeneracy strategy aims at "multi ply providing" some (or all) critical sys tem components over structurally differ ent parts (degeneracy).
An in-depth discussion of transformation strategies is beyond the scope of this paper and will be presented elsewhere.
Related Work
The FIS-approach is based on the IS framework which has been shown to be more expressive than comparable modeling methodologies like Petri Nets or communicat ing FSM [5] . The latter ones suffer from in herent difficulties in enunciating restrictions, violations, and enforcements. Additionally, the intrinsic possibility of incrementally mod eling in-the-Iarge reveals a further advantage of IS. The IS framework has, however, not been applied for modeling property preserva tion (like survivability) in "compromised en vironments". The folding mechanisms we pre sented here are examples to close this gap.
Survivability of IT systems, on the other hand, is a relatively new research area with a precise definition of what to achieve and a common understanding of the means how to achieve the goals still lacking. Nonetheless, there are already some more or less mature ar chitectures available with mostly domain spe cific modeling frameworks [8] . None of them, however, provides a formally sound model ing framework or a practical methodology for dealing with incremental restrictions. Emer gent algorithms have been proposed in [1] for achieving survivability. Although a promis ing approach, they require a global observer and do not provide an adequate model for reasoning about propagation of influences.
Related work is also performed in the au tonomic computing community when study ing self*-mechanisms [9] . The autonomic models include very interesting control loops constructs but do not allow reasoning about mutual exclusions of local states and influence propagations.
Conclusion and Further Work
Survivability is a global system property. A problem arises when studying survivabil ity in unbounded systems as there is no cen tral control and the system components only have a limited view on the system-as-a-whole. In such systems global properties can only be achieved by purposefully influencing bi lateral interactions to propagate. A compre hensive modeling framework for investigating the global effects of local activities is miss ing. We proposed Folded Interaction Sys tems (FIS) as such a framework. FIS uses the Interaction Systems framework for describing system structures and interactions between components and introduces the concept IS foldings to derive essential system capabili ties, to describe incidents, and to derive sur-136 vivability sustaining strategies. We demon strated the appropriateness of FIS by apply ing it to the analysis of a production Grid authorization framework.
The work presented here is a first cor nerstone of a comprehensive "survivability toolkit" for unbounded systems including runtime incident detection capabilities and dynamic overwrite mechanisms.
